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Objects are reminiscent of actions often performed with them: knife and apple remind us
on peeling the apple or cutting it. Mnemonic representations of object-related actions
(action codes) evoked by the sight of an object may constrain and hence facilitate
recognition of unrolling actions. The present fMRI study investigated if and how action
codes influence brain activation during action observation. The average number of action
codes (NAC) of 51 sets of objects was rated by a group of n = 24 participants. In an fMRI
study, different volunteers were asked to recognize actions performed with the same
objects presented in short videos. To disentangle areas reflecting the storage of action
codes from those exploiting them, we showed object-compatible and object-incompatible
(pantomime) actions. Areas storing action codes were considered to positively co-vary
with NAC in both object-compatible and object-incompatible action; due to its role in
tool-related tasks, we here hypothesized left anterior inferior parietal cortex (aIPL). In
contrast, areas exploiting action codes were expected to show this correlation only in
object-compatible but not incompatible action, as only object-compatible actions match
one of the active action codes. For this interaction, we hypothesized ventrolateral premotor
cortex (PMv) to join aIPL due to its role in biasing competition in IPL. We found left anterior
intraparietal sulcus (IPS) and left posterior middle temporal gyrus (pMTG) to co-vary with
NAC. In addition to these areas, action codes increased activity in object-compatible action
in bilateral PMv, right IPS, and lateral occipital cortex (LO). Findings suggest that during
action observation, the brain derives possible actions from perceived objects, and uses
this information to shape action recognition. In particular, the number of expectable actions
quantifies the activity level at PMv, IPL, and pMTG, but only PMv reflects their biased
competition while observed action unfolds.
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INTRODUCTION
Observed action entails a highly complex stimulus that prompts
a multitude of attentional and memory processes. The observer
has to be flexible with regard to potential actions that may unroll,
but yet quickly discard those which do not pertain to the actual
situation. How is this achieved?
When considering object-related action, the observer has
access to at least two sources of information that usually help
him to quickly recognize the most probable action goal: manip-
ulation movements and objects. These two basic sources of
information, rather than being complementary, are intimately
interrelated: familiar objects such as mobile phones or knifes
are strongly reminiscent of manipulations that we perform
with them everyday. Hence, the observer’s brain may use these
automatically evoked memories of distinct object-related actions
(action codes, hereafter) to bias or constrain expectation on
upcoming manipulations and hence facilitate recognition of the
action, i.e., implemented object function, and thereby the prob-
able actor’s goal. For instance, when seeing someone handling
a knife and an apple, the object set “knife, apple” evokes two
action codes: “cutting apple with knife” and “peeling apple
with knife.” While tracking the unfolding manipulation, we at
a point in time notice that the peeling-action code matches the
observed manipulation, and recognize the actor is peeling the
apple with the knife (object function), probably to prepare it for
eating (goal).
The present fMRI study focused on automatically evoked
object-related action codes to find out if, and if so how, they influ-
ence the neural basis of action observation. In order to recognize
an observed action, it wouldmake no sense to match the observed
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action to all possible action memories we have. Rather, one could
suggest that objects automatically evoke mnemonic codes of the
handful of actions we most frequently perform with them (i.e.,
action codes) (Helbig et al., 2006; Myung et al., 2006; Campanella
and Shallice, 2011), information that could greatly constrain the
number of expectable actions. Note that we very quickly recog-
nize objects (Bar, 2003), including their pragmatic properties (Liu
et al., 2009; Proverbio et al., 2011), while observed manipulation
only unfolds and disambiguates in time.
Although the notion of action codes is reminiscent of what
is called object affordance, they differ in an important respect.
According to the classical concept of affordance (Gibson, 1977;
see McGrenere and Ho, 2000 for modifications and alternatives),
an object affords actions in that seeing the object can automat-
ically prime, and hence facilitate, object-compatible actions in
a particular observer (depending also on the observer’s body);
the object does so by virtue of its physical properties: e.g., size
and shape of the object afford appropriate grasping, and its loca-
tion appropriate pointing (Tucker and Ellis, 1998, 2001, 2004;
Craighero et al., 1999; Pavese and Buxbaum, 2002; Phillips and
Ward, 2002; Derbyshire et al., 2006; Symes et al., 2007; Cho and
Proctor, 2010; Pellicano et al., 2010; Iani et al., 2011; McBride
et al., 2012). In contrast, we here were interested in object-
evoked representations of actions that do not derive from the
object’s size, shape or orientation, but from associative memo-
ries of how and what for we use these objects in everyday life.
Note that our manipulation did not dissociate this “how” and
“what for,” which can be doubly dissociated in patient groups
(Buxbaum and Saffran, 2002).
To show that action codes are effective during action obser-
vation, we should find that it makes a difference how many
action codes are currently evoked, and whether the observed
action matches one of them or not. Accordingly we should
find (H1) increased activity in areas that code for currently
active action codes; and (H2) increased activity in areas that
exploit them for action recognition. In order to disentangle
these effects, we presented object-compatible (normal) action
and object-incompatible (pantomime) action. As an example for
an incompatible action, the actor performed the movements for
“cracking an egg” while holding and moving an orange and
an orange squeezer. Object-compatible and object-incompatible
actions were performed on objects whose NACs, i.e., number of
possible action codes related to them, were assessed in a pre-fMRI
rating study (see Methods and Figure 1).
The NAC effect (H1) should be only driven by the perceived
object(s) but be independent of the actually observed action.
Thus, we considered areas that positively co-vary with the NAC
during object-compatible and object-incompatible action to clas-
sify as areas storing action codes. In contrast, currently evoked
action codes can only be exploited for action recognition (H2)
when observing the former, but not the latter. That means, only
if the observed actor executes one of the currently evoked action
codes, i.e., in object-compatible actions, can the observer benefit
from their automatic pre-activation.
Thus, these action codes put an effective constraint on the to-
be-expected possible actions, and identification of the matching
action will be enhanced. In terms of neural computation, this
results in a continuous, top-down reinforcement of the match-
ing action code, in competition to all currently active action
codes, during ongoing action observation (see neuroanatomi-
cal hypotheses below). This reinforcement may be achieved by
enhancement of the matching action code, or by inhibition of
the currently competing but non-matching action codes, or both.
Since the present approach could not distinguish between these
options, we will refer to this mechanism shortly as “reinforce-
ment” hereafter.
It is particularly essential that, in order to interpret an area’s
activation as exerting a reinforcement of one particular action
code among all currently evoked and hence competing action
codes, rather than simply signaling for a successful matching,
this activation has to depend on competition strength: to make
the particular matching action code to come out on top of three
possible actions (NAC 3) is more demanding than on top of
two actions or only one (NAC 2 or 1, respectively). Accordingly,
regarding (H2), we were not interested in the main effect of object
compatibility, but rather in the interaction between the NAC and
object compatibility: We considered areas that positively co-vary
with the NAC during object-compatible significantly more than
during object-incompatible action to classify as areas exploiting
the currently active action codes. These areas should show a sig-
nificant parametric effect of NAC in object-compatible actions,
no significant parametric effect of NAC in object-incompatible
actions, and a significant interaction between the NAC and object
compatibility.
Regarding the neural correlates of action code storage (H1),
we hypothesized that activity in the left anterior inferior pari-
etal lobule (aIPL) increases with the NAC, no matter whether
the movie shows an object-compatible or an action-incompatible
manipulation. During tool-related tasks, left aIPL is often seen
in co-activation with left ventral premotor cortex (PMv) and the
posterior middle temporal gyrus (pMTG) (Johnson-Frey, 2004;
Culham and Valyear, 2006; Martin, 2007; Creem-Regehr, 2009),
i.e., exactly the same network that is reported for action obser-
vation (Grèzes and Decety, 2001; Van Overwalle and Baetens,
2009; Caspers et al., 2010), but also for action execution, action
imagery, action planning, and action imitation. This network
has been referred to as MNS (mirror neuron system) or AON
(action observation network), but due to the spectrum of action-
related roles of this triad, the label “Action Network” might
be more generic. Regarding our hypothesis on areas housing
action codes (H1) we focused on aIPL because of converging
findings from various studies reporting left aIPL to be engaged
in the representation of pragmatic properties of objects, partic-
ularly manipulation knowledge (e.g., Chao and Martin, 2000;
Kellenbach et al., 2003; Johnson-Frey, 2004; Rumiati et al., 2004;
Boronat et al., 2005; Ishibashi et al., 2011). In her thorough
review, Creem-Regehr (2009) proposed to conceive of the inferior
IPL/IPS as a region for motor cognition, including the genera-
tion of internal representations for action and knowledge about
actions. Patient studies indicate that the ability to retrieve the cor-
rect manipulation for a given tool can be selectively impaired,
while in the same patient, the ability to correctly name the tool
or point to the tool when named by the experimenter are pre-
served (Ochipa et al., 1989). This defect in tool utilization has
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FIGURE 1 | Rating values for the number of action codes (NAC) related to
51 objects/object sets as assessed pre-experimentally in an independent
group of n = 24 volunteers. Values were subsequently used to model the
BOLD fMRI amplitude during object-compatible and object-incompatible
action. Some values are highlighted and correspond to the objects shown in
the photos, based on which participants delivered their ratings. For instance,
the object set “pencil and sharpener” were mostly reported to be related to
“sharpening a pencil” (resulting in NAC=1), whereas “candle and lighter”
participants often associated “lighting a candle,” and sometimes also “melting
a candle’s foot” (in order to firmly fixate it in a candle stand) (NAC=1.65).
been coined limb apraxia (Rothi and Heilman, 1997). In spite
of considerable variance between findings, evidence converges
that patients with impaired object use and pantomiming to visu-
ally presented objects mostly suffer from lesions that include the
left IPL (Rumiati et al., 2004). This region is considered cru-
cial for gestural praxis, tool knowledge, body part knowledge,
and manipulation knowledge, together coined as the ability to
generate internal models of object-interaction (Buxbaum et al.,
2005).
The frontal component of the Action Network, the left PMv,
was expected to respond quite differently than aIPL. In relation
to our second question, whether there would be areas reflecting
the selection among competing action codes, we hypothesized
(H2) the left PMv to be enhanced by the number of action codes,
but in contrast to aIPL only for object-compatible, not object-
incompatible action videos. That is, we should see left PMv only
for the interaction between NAC and object compatibility of the
observed action.
This hypothesis was motivated by the notion that premotor
regions serve the top-down selection among alternative manipu-
lation options provided in parietal areas (Fagg and Arbib, 1998;
Rushworth et al., 2003). The lateral premotor cortex is made of
a variety of functionally highly specialized sub-areas which in
turn are connected in multiple parallel, largely segregated loops
to a mosaic of sub-areas making of the parietal cortex (Luppino
and Rizzolatti, 2000). Among these premotor-parietal loops, the
ventral premotor—inferior parietal loop was reported to code
for grasping and manipulation (Rizzolatti et al., 1987), but also
for the sight of graspable objects (via so-called canonical neu-
rons in PMv, Murata et al., 1997; Rizzolatti and Fadiga, 1998).
As for fronto-parietal loops in general, the functional role of PMv
with regard to IPL is providing inhibitory and reinforcing input
to focus and elevate currently relevant codes in IPL to modulate
adaptive perception, attention and behavior.
Addressing the interplay between lateral premotor and pari-
etal areas in object-directed action, Fagg and Arbib (1998) put
forward that anterior parietal cortex provides ventral premo-
tor cortex with a multiple description of how the object can
be grasped and used. In PMv, then, all corresponding motor
acts are first activated, and then the currently required one is
selected (or reinforced, to keep with the more process-dynamic
notion adopted above). For instance, neurophysiological stud-
ies in macaques indicate that potential plans for movements to
multiple targets are simultaneously represented in parietal and
frontal areas (Andersen and Cui, 2009) and, as information accu-
mulates, eliminated in a competition for overt execution (Cisek
and Kalaska, 2005) (for an application of the notion of selec-
tion as frontoparietal reinforcement signal in humans, see e.g.,
Ramsey et al., 2013). Fagg and Arbib (1998) proposed that in
action execution, this selection needs prefrontal input (via pre-
supplementary motor area) that signals the current goals of
the individual. However recent imaging findings indicate that
action selection that emerges from the race between competi-
tive decision-units is reflected in premotor, not prefrontal, areas
(Rowe et al., 2010), suggesting that action selection in premotor
sites does not necessarily need prefrontal bias.
In the present experimental approach, competition between
the action codes evoked by the perceived object was to be resolved
by the actually observedmanipulation.We expected that in case of
a successful match (which was only possible for object-compatible
actions), the PMv would reinforce the matching action codes
in aIPL, just as it does during action execution. Load on this
reinforcement would be a function of action codes only in
object-compatible action, as outlined above, manifesting in an
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interaction of the NAC and object compatibility of the observed
action. Of course, if PMv does exert an action code dependent
reinforcing signal on aIPL during action observation, this effect
should be reflected in both of these areas.
Finally, in object-incompatible action, reinforcement load
should be generally higher than in object-compatible action, as
action recognition is unrestricted by the currently evoked action
codes: there are objects that evoke action codes, but none of them
matches the observed action. That does also mean, reinforce-
ment load should not depend on the number of action codes
in case of object-incompatible actions. Since objects employed
in object-incompatible actions evoke action codes that are not
effective to constrain the matching process, the number of pos-
sible actions is the number of all possible actions that humans
do perform with objects. Accordingly, our third hypothesis (H3)
was that object-incompatible actions lead to an overall higher
response than object-compatible actions in left PMv and IPL
(replicating Schubotz and von Cramon, 2009), but show no pos-




Seventeen right-handed, healthy volunteers (13 women, 20–31
years, mean age 25.6 years) participated in the study. After being
informed about potential risks and screened by a physician of
the institution, participants gave informed consent before partic-
ipating. The local ethics committee of the University of Cologne
approved the experimental standards. Data were handled anony-
mously.
STIMULI AND TASKS
Subjects were presented with two kinds of trials, videos showing
actions (snapshots in Figure 2; for examples of videos, see supple-
mentary material) and short verbal action descriptions (without
video) referring to these actions (e.g., “cutting bread,” “peeling an
apple,” “cleaning a cell phone”). Each trial lasted 6 s and started
with a movie (2 s) followed by a fixation phase (Figure 3). The
length of the fixation phase (2.5–4 s) depended on the variable jit-
ter times (0, 500, 1000, or 1500ms) that were inserted before the
movie to enhance the temporal resolution of the BOLD response.
Actions were either performed on appropriate objects (object-
compatible actions, e.g., peeling an apple with a knife) or on
inappropriate objects (object-incompatible actions, e.g., making
the same movements with a pencil and a sharpener).
Subjects were instructed to attend to the presented movies.
They were informed that some of the movies were followed by
a trial providing a verbal action description that either matched
or did not match the content of the preceding movie. Subjects
then performed a verification task, i.e., they were asked to indi-
cate by button press whether the verbal description was consistent
with the action movie previously presented or not. It was empha-
sized that it did not play any role whether actions, to which
the action description referred, were object-compatible or not.
Thus, when subjects saw the action “peeling an apple” performed
with an apple and a knife, or with a pencil and a sharpener,
and the subsequent trial delivered the verbal action description
FIGURE 2 | Snapshots of videos showing actions with objects mostly
related to either one (left panel) or two (right panel) actions. Actions
could be exploited to constrain action recognition only in object-compatible
actions (lower panel; examples show “applying toothpaste” on the left and
“cutting an apple” on the right), but not in object-incompatible actions
(upper panel; examples show “cutting a fruit” on the left and “sharpening a
pencil” on the right). The corresponding videos can be found in the
supplementary material.
“peeling an apple,” the correct answer was “yes.” In the case of an
action description trial, participants immediately delivered their
responses on a two-button response box using their index finger
for affirmative responses (description pertains to the movie in the
preceding trial) and their middle finger for rejections (descrip-
tion did not pertain to the movie in the preceding trial). Half
of the action descriptions were to be affirmed and half to be
rejected.
Action movies varied with regard to the number of action
codes (Figure 1; see also “Pre-experimental assessment on
objects’ average number of action codes”). Importantly, in case
that two or three objects were involved in an action, they always
made up object sets that were indicative of possible actions
(which were, of course, not actually performed in the case of
object-incompatible actions); e.g., participants were presented
the object-incompatible action “cracking an egg” performed in
an as-if manner on the objects “orange” and “orange squeezer,”
i.e., a pair of objects that could be used to prepare orange juice
(Figure 2). Thus, videos showing object-incompatible actions
never involved meaningless object sets such as e.g., an orange and
a sharpener.
Twenty percent of themovies (i.e., 21 of 105 object-compatible
actions and 21 of 105 object-incompatible actions) were fol-
lowed by an action description that had the length of a regular
trial (2 s description, including response phase, plus 4 s fixation
phase), resulting in 42 additional trials. Finally, 20 empty trials
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FIGURE 3 | Example sequence of five trials with within-trial time
course for one video trial (top) and for one question trial (bottom).
(resting state) of 6 s duration were presented intermixed with the
experimental trials. Thus, 272 trials were presented altogether.
For each subject, each action was presented four times dur-
ing the course of the experimental session, two times object-
compatible and two times object-incompatible, with different
objects each time. Importantly, we balanced the order of appear-
ance of object-compatible and incompatible actions in the time
course of the appearance. Hence, all combinations (1: compatible,
compatible, incompatible, incompatible; 2: compatible, incom-
patible, compatible, incompatible; 3: incompatible, compatible,
incompatible, compatible; 4: incompatible, incompatible, com-
patible, compatible) occurred equally often in the experiment.
PRE-EXPERIMENTAL ASSESSMENT ON AVERAGE NUMBER OF ACTION
CODES
In order to determine the NACs of the objects later used in
the action movies, we assessed the spontaneous assignment of
actions to these objects in a group of n = 24 volunteers. To
avoid mnemonic confounds, this group was not identical to
the group tested in the fMRI session, i.e., none of the partic-
ipants of the pre-experimental assessment was included in the
fMRI study. Participants were given photographs of 51 objects
(e.g., cell phone) or object sets (e.g., apple and knife). There
were 27% single objects, 63% two-object sets and 10% 3-object
sets. Participants were asked to write down all potential actions
that the presented objects were typically reminiscent of in their
eyes. For instance, participants rated an apple and a knife to
be most suggestive of “cutting an apple into halves,” “peeling
an apple,” and “coring an intact apple” (3 actions), whereas
an orange and an orange squeezer were rated suggestive of
“squeezing an orange” (1 action). To assess NACs rather than
object affordances, participants were explicitly asked to pro-
vide object-specific goal-directed actions, not object grasping or
transport.
We did not impose a temporal restriction onto this rating pro-
cess and participants had time to thoroughly ponder on potential
actions. The collection of actions typically took less than 1min
per object or object set; moreover, no participant came up with
invalid or odd actions. On the basis of this rating, the aver-
age NAC score was calculated for each object or set of objects
(Figure 1). NAC scores, ranging from 0.95 to 2.73, were subse-
quently used in the parametric analysis of fMRI data (see below).
Importantly, there was no systematic relation between NAC score
and number of objects in a set. Thus, single objects yielded amean
NAC of 1.63 ± 0.33, two-object-sets 1.66 ± 0.4, and three-object
sets 1.18± 0.1. To statistically rule out the potential confound that
NAC co-vary with the number of objects displayed in an action,
we calculated a correlation of NAC with the number of objects.
There was no correlation [r(49) = −0.223, p = 0.12].
MRI DATA ACQUISITION
Twenty-two axial slices (192mm field of view; 64 × 64 pixel
matrix; 4mm thickness; 1mm spacing; in-plane resolution of
3 × 3mm) parallel to bi-commissural line (AC–PC) covering
the whole brain were acquired using a single-shot gradient EPI
sequence (2 s repetition time; 30ms echo time; 90◦ flip angle;
116 kHz acquisition bandwidth) sensitive to BOLD contrast.
Prior to the functional imaging, 26 anatomical T1-weighted
MDEFT images (Ugurbil et al., 1993; Norris, 2000) with the
same spatial orientation as the functional data were acquired.
In a separate session, high-resolution whole-brain images (160
slices of 1mm thickness) were acquired from each partici-
pant to improve the localization of activation foci using a T1-
weighted 3-D-segmented MDEFT sequence covering the whole
brain.
fMRI DATA ANALYSIS
After offline motion-correction using the Siemens motion pro-
tocol PACE (Siemens, Erlangen, Germany), fMRI data were pro-
cessed using the software package LIPSIA (Lohmann et al., 2001).
To correct for the temporal offset between the slices acquired
in one image, a cubic-spline interpolation was employed. Low-
frequency signal changes and baseline drifts were removed using
a temporal high-pass filter with a cutoff frequency of 1/90Hz.
Spatial smoothing was performed with a Gaussian filter of
5.65mm FWHM (SD = 0.8 voxel). To align the functional data
slices with a 3-D stereotactic coordinate reference system, a rigid
linear registration with six degrees of freedom (three rotational,
three translational) was performed.
The rotational and translational parameters were acquired
on the basis of the MDEFT slices to achieve an optimal match
between these slices and the individual 3-D reference dataset. The
MDEFT volume dataset with 160 slices and 1-mm slice thickness
was standardized to the Talairach stereotactic space (Talairach
and Tournoux, 1988). The rotational and translational parame-
ters were subsequently transformed by linear scaling to the same
standard size. The resulting parameters were then used to trans-
form the functional slices employing a trilinear interpolation, so
that the resulting functional slices were aligned with the stereo-
tactic coordinate system. Resulting data had a spatial resolution
of 3 × 3 × 3mm (27mm3).
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The statistical evaluation was based on a least-squares estima-
tion using the general linear model for serially auto-correlated
observations (Friston et al., 1995; Worsley and Friston, 1995).
The design matrix was generated with a delta function, convolved
with the hemodynamic response function (gamma function)
(Glover, 1999). The design matrix comprised the following
events: object-compatible action videos, object-incompatible
action videos, object-compatible action videos with an amplitude
modeled by the corresponding objects’ NAC, object-incompatible
action videos with an amplitude modeled by the correspond-
ing objects’ NAC, question trials, and empty trials (null
events).
Brain activations were analyzed time-locked to onset of the
videos. The model equation, including the observation data, the
design matrix, and the error term, was convolved with a Gaussian
kernel of dispersion of 4 s FWHM to account for the temporal
autocorrelation (Worsley and Friston, 1995). In the following,
contrast images, that is, beta value estimates of the raw-score
differences between specified conditions were generated for each
participant. As all individual functional datasets were aligned to
the same stereotactic reference space, the single-subject contrast
images were entered into a second-level random effects analysis
for each of the contrasts.
One-sample t-tests were employed for the group analyses
across the contrast images of all participants that indicated
whether observed differences between conditions were signifi-
cantly distinct from zero. The t-values were subsequently trans-
formed into z-scores. To correct for false-positive results, an
initial z-threshold was set to 2.33 (p < 0.01, one-tailed). In a sec-
ond step, the results were corrected for multiple comparisons at
the cluster level, using cluster size and cluster value thresholds
that were obtained by Monte-Carlo simulations at a significance
level of p = 0.05, i.e., the reported activations were significantly




Performance was assessed by error rates and reaction times.
We calculated paired-t-tests (one-tailed, in expectation of
lower performance in object-incompatible actions) for each
of these measures between question trials addressing object-
incompatible and object-compatible actions. While error rates
became not significant (t16 = −0.66, p = 0.259), reaction times
showed a small effect (t16 = 1.75, p = 0.049). Thus, object-
compatible and object-incompatible actions were responded to
equally correct (mean ± SE: object-compatible action 5.8 ±
1.2% errors and object-incompatible 4.8 ± 1.4% errors), but
recognition of object-incompatible actions took 40ms longer
(object-compatible action 1192± 61ms and object-incompatible
1232 ± 69ms).
Moreover, we calculated bivariate correlations between NACs
and reaction times or error rates, respectively. As a result, there
was neither an effect on error rates [r(16) = −0.012, p = 0.96],
nor on reaction times [r(16) = −0.026, p = 0.92]. Together,
behavioral statistics suggested that recognition times were
slightly but significantly reduced by object information, but both
object-incompatible and object-compatible actions could be
successfully identified.
As a caveat, we employed a retrospective judgment in order to
control for the participants’ performance in action recognition.
This task was implemented by extra question trials that followed
an action observation trial in order to avoid response-related
confounds: motor execution, and, even worse, trial-specific inter-
actions between executed button press, implied and observed
manipulations. That is, reaction times and error rates refer
to a response delivered one trial after action observation. So,
our paradigm was optimized for fMRI rather than for specific
behavioral effects.
fMRI RESULTS
Our two main hypotheses H1 and H2 addressed the paramet-
ric effect of number of action codes. In left aIPL, this effect
was expected to be independent of the object-compatibility of
the observed action (Hypothesis H1), but depend on object-
compatibility in PMv (Hypothesis H2). H1 was tested by calcu-
lating a conjunction of the thresholded parametric contrast in
object-compatible actions and the thresholded parametric con-
trast in object-incompatible actions. H2 was tested by an interac-
tion contrast, i.e., by contrasting the parametric effect of number
of action codes in object-compatible actions with the parametric
effect of number of action codes in object-incompatible actions.
While H2 addressed compatible > incompatible actions, we also
report the reverse contrast for exploratory reasons. We follow
the view that in order to show that differences between the two
parametric effects (number or action codes in object-compatible
actions, number of actions in object-incompatible actions) are
statistically significant, it is not enough to show each of them,
but to calculate a contrast between both, i.e., an interaction
(Nieuwenhuis et al., 2011). In order to make their respective con-
tributions to these two effects descriptively transparent, however,
we also report the parametric effect in object-compatible actions
and the parametric effect in object-incompatible actions sepa-
rately. Finally, we report findings on the main effect of object
compatibility of observed action (Hypothesis H3).
Parametric effect of number of action codes (NAC) common to
object-compatible and object-incompatible actions (Hypothesis H1)
The conjunction between the thresholded parametric effect of
action codes in object-compatible actions and the thresholded
parametric effect of action codes in object-incompatible actions
revealed activation in the left aIPS and in the left posterior middle
temporal gyrus (pMTG). Both areas showed increasing activation
with the number of possible actions associated with the objects
shown in the movies (Figure 4A, Table 1).
Interaction effect of NAC and object-compatibility (Hypothesis H2)
Parametric effect of NAC in object-incompatible actions. For
object-incompatible action, activity increased with number of
action codes in the left aIPS, the left pMTG, encroaching into
adjacent pSTS and TPJ, and in the left Cuneus (Figure 4D,
Table 2).
Parametric effect of NAC in object-compatible actions. For
object-compatible action, activity increased with number of
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FIGURE 4 | The mere sight of objects triggered the representation of a
number of possible object-related actions that quantified the activation
in several cortical areas (P < 0.05, corrected for multiple comparisons).
(A) Left aIPL and pMTG can be considered to code for the number of
object-related action codes (NAC), as their activity increased with the NAC
regardless of whether the observed action was object-compatible (and hence
matched one of the evoked NACs) or object-incompatible (cf. Hypothesis H1).
(B) In contrast, PMv, right IPS, left pIPS, bilateral LO and mid-insula increased
with NAC only in object-compatible action, presumably reflecting a top-down
competition bias between the observed and the remaining object-related but
unobserved actions (cf. Hypothesis H2). Interestingly, left pSTS/TPJ
increased with NAC in object-incompatible actions blue spot in (B) suggesting
that in case of a non-match, lower constraints on expectable actions (i.e.,
higher NACs) increased efforts to read out the actor’s hand postures and
movements. For descriptive purposes, (C) and (D) show the NAC effect
separately for videos on object-compatible and object-incompatible
(pantomime-with-incompatible-objects) actions. Table 1 lists Talairach
coordinates for z-maps shown in (A) and (B), Table 2 for (C) and (D).
action codes in the Action Network (PM, aIPL, pMTG) as well
as the fusiform gyrus/lateral occipital cortex and mid-insula. All
activation spots were found in both hemispheres (Figure 4C,
Table 2).
Interaction effect of NAC in object-compatible > incompatible
actions. For object-compatible action, additional activation was
found to increase with the NAC in right ventral and dorsal pre-
motor cortex (PMv, PMd) as well as in bilateral mid-insula.
Moreover, activation in IPS was recorded bilaterally and extended
from anterior into its horizontal segments. Finally, activation
in the pMTG extended inferiorly and posteriorly into the lat-
eral occipital cortex (LO) and emerged particularly in the right
hemisphere (Figure 4B, Table 1).
Interaction effect of NAC in object-incompatible > object-
compatible actions. Some areas responded to increasing number
of evoked action codes exclusively during object-incompatible
actions. These were located in the left pSTS, extending posteri-
orly and dorsally into the temporo-parietal junction (TPJ), and
in left cuneus (Figure 4B, Table 1).
Main effects of observation of object-compatible and
object-incompatible action (Hypothesis H3)
The present study employed object-compatible and object-
incompatible action to investigate the effects of action codes and
their impact on action observation. However, it is important to
consider that all effects so far reported supervened on the typ-
ical network found for action observation (cf. Introduction),
including the lateral premotor-parietal loops as well as temporo-
occipital areas related to attention to motion, movements and
objects (Figure 5A). Recorded activation patterns were almost
identical for object-compatible and object-incompatible actions
when compared to rest, but direct contrasts revealed significant
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Table 1 | Anatomical area (for abbreviations, see main text), Talairach
coordinates (x, y, z) and maximal Z -score (max) of activated clusters
(p = 0.05, corrected for multiple comparisons) for parametric effects
of the number of automatically evoked object-related action codes
(NAC) that were common to both for object-compatible and object-
incompatible actions (conjunction; Hypothesis H1) or interacted
with object compatibility of observed action (Hypothesis H2)
(cf. Figures 4A,B).
Area x y z Max
H1: NAC IN BOTH OBJECT COMPATIBLE ∩ INCOMPATIBLE ACTION
aIPS −62 −24 36 3.08
pMTG −47 −66 9 2.83
H2: INTERACTION NAC x OBJECT COMPATIBLE > INCOMPATIBLE
ACTIONS
PMv −56 9 27 3.08
52 9 24 4.43
aIPS −50 −27 36 4.18
40 −27 42 5.22
pIPS −35 −54 63 3.66
31 −45 66 4.61
Mid-Insula −38 −6 21 3.24
34 −3 34 3.42
LO / pMTG 37 −69 −3 4.07
Cuneus 22 −90 6 5.10
pSTS / TPJ −59 −57 15 −3.65
Cuneus −8 −81 0 −4.81
differences in themodulations of this network as well, particularly
enhanced activity in left PMv and IPL for object-incompatible
actions (Figure 5B). For object-compatible actions, we found
enhanced activity solely in fusiform areas (Figure 5C). These
findings fully replicate those of a previous study (Schubotz and
von Cramon, 2009; Figure 3).
In contrast to the findings in Schubotz and von Cramon
(2009), object-incompatible actions in the current study addi-
tionally activated mesial Brodmann Area (BA) 8, the ventral
tegmental area and the bilateral dorsal anterior insula (not shown
in Figure 5). These activations probably reflect dopaminergic
enhancement during decision uncertainty (Volz et al., 2005).
We consider this difference to be due to the use of object sets
that always implied valid action options for object-compatible
as well as for object-incompatible actions, in contrast to our
previous study. Thus, uncertainty was somewhat higher for
object-incompatible, as objects did not indicate whether the to-
be-expected action would be an object-incompatible or an object-
compatible action, and action codes could not become effective to
constrain the process of identifying the observed action.
DISCUSSION
Objects are reminiscent of actions that we typically perform with
them. These object-related actions (action codes) may influence
action observation by providing a constraint on the number of
expectable actions, and hence facilitate action recognition. We
used fMRI in an action observation paradigm to test whether
left aIPL codes for action codes, i.e., whether its activation level
Table 2 | Anatomical area (for abbreviations, see main text), Talairach
coordinates (x, y, z) and maximal Z-score (max) of activated clusters
(p = 0.05, corrected for multiple comparisons) for parametric effects
of the number of automatically evoked object-related action codes
(NAC), separately analyzed for object-compatible actions and for
object-incompatible actions (cf. Figures 4C,D).
Area x y z Max
NAC IN OBJECT-COMPATIBLE ACTIONS
aIPS/SMG −47 −24 33 5.38
49 −21 33 5.67
pMTG, LO −47 −63 3 3.51
43 −63 0 4.79
Fusiform gyrus / LO −47 −75 −6 3.06
Fusiform gyrus 46 −45 −12 3.18
pIPS −32 −51 60 5.74
28 −48 60 5.39
37 −30 39 5.91
PMv −56 6 27 4.23
52 9 27 5.29
PMd 22 −12 51 3.64
Mid-Insula −38 3 12 4.55
31 −6 18 4.77
NAC IN OBJECT-INCOMPATIBLE ACTIONS
aIPS −62 −24 33 3.15
pMTG/pSTS/TPJ −53 −69 21 4.13
Cuneus −14 −78 −3 4.59
varies as a function of the currently evoked number of action
codes (main effect action codes; Hypothesis H1). Moreover,
we employed object-compatible and object-incompatible action
videos to test whether left PMv reflects the exploitation of evoked
action codes. Here we reasoned that an area that exploits action
codes in action observation should positively co-vary with the
NAC in case of object-compatible, but not object-incompatible
action, since action codes can act as a constraint only in the
former (interaction effect action codes x object compatibility;
Hypothesis H2).
In expectation to replicate findings from a previous study
(Schubotz and von Cramon, 2009), we hypothesized that object-
compatible and object-incompatible action differ in highly sim-
ilar way from the resting level, but when directly contrasted
with one another show enhanced activity for object-incompatible
actions in the entire Action Network, including left PMv and IPL
(Hypothesis H3).
RESPONSES TO AUTOMATICALLY EVOKED CODES OF
OBJECT-RELATED ACTIONS
Object-compatible and object-incompatible actions differed with
respect to the usability of object information, but objects implied
possible actions in both. To tap this object-based action-pre-
activation, we computed the parametric effect of the number of
action codes separately for object-compatible actions and object-
incompatible actions, and subsequently built the conjunction of
both. As a result, activity was recorded in only two areas, the left
aIPL and the left pMTG (Figure 4A). Finding aIPL confirmed our
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FIGURE 5 | Significant activation differences addressed by Hypothesis
(H3) (P < 0.05, corrected for multiple comparisons) that replicate
previous findings (Schubotz and von Cramon, 2009). (A) Main effects of
observation of object-compatible and object-incompatible action as
compared to rest (conjunction). (B) and (C): Differential effects as revealed
by direct contrasts between observation of object-compatible and
object-incompatible action. Both object-compatible and object-incompatible
actions induce strong activation in the Action Network, including
premotor-parietal and temporo-occipital areas. This activation pattern is
even intensified by object-incompatible action (B) where participants have
to rely on manipulation information to recognize the action.
Correspondingly, activity is significantly enhanced in fusiform gyrus when
object information is valid (C).
hypothesis, which was based on the role of inferior parietal lobe in
the appraisal of pragmatic implications provided by objects. Left
pMTG was not hypothesized and will be discussed as a post-hoc
finding.
The left IPL activation was restricted to the anterior bank of
the intraparietal sulcus (aIPS) and did not encroach into supra-
marginal gyrus (SMG). This is an important observation, since
these two areas have distinct functions, as implicated by research
in their putative homologues in the macaque, AIP and PF, respec-
tively (Committeri et al., 2007; McGeoch et al., 2007). The latter
mediates between PMv and pSTS in a network coined “mirror
neuron system” or MNS for both action observation and action
execution (as lucidly outlined in Keysers and Perrett, 2004),
whereas the former provides PMv with a pragmatic description
of objects (Fagg and Arbib, 1998). The core difference here is that
neurons in AIP already respond to objects even when not manip-
ulated, whereas PF neurons are particularly tuned to the sight
of the experimenter grasping and manipulating objects (Gallese
et al., 2002).
This difference seems particularly relevant in the context of the
present findings, as the conjunction contrast aimed to tap only
the parametric effects of object-evoked action knowledge, inde-
pendent of the object-compatibility of the observed manipulation.
It makes perfect sense that the parametric action codes contrast
did not identify SMG (as putative human PF-homolog), because
activation that was caused by observation was accounted for by
the main effect action vs. rest (Figure 5), i.e., it was canceled
out in the parametric action codes contrast. Notably, exploita-
tion of action codes was reflected by extension of activation
into SMG that we found only for object-compatible actions, as
will be discussed later. Thus, our findings perfectly corroborate
the assumption of a functional dissociation or relative weight-
ing of AIP/aIPS reflecting object-related action information and
PF/SMG reflecting the observation of object manipulation.
Human and macaque data converge with regard to the
manipulation-related role of anterior intraparietal cortex. The
role of macaque AIP in providing pragmatic object descriptions
has been related to “hand manipulation neurons” (Gardner et al.,
2007a) in this region and to the encoding of context-specific
hand grasping movements to perceived objects (Gallese et al.,
1994; Murata et al., 1996; Baumann et al., 2009). Human left
aIPL is selectively activated during the explicit retrieval of specific
ways of grasping tools (Chao and Martin, 2000) and manip-
ulating objects (Kellenbach et al., 2003). Using an interaction
design implementing two cue types (naming and pantomiming)
and two response triggers (objects and actions), Rumiati et al.
(2004) showed that the left aIPL is particularly active for the
transforming objects into skilled object manipulation. A recent
fMRI study showed that activity in human aIPS reflects the rela-
tionship between object features and grasp type, as in macaques
(Begliomini et al., 2007). Also paralleling macaque data, aIPS is
particularly enhanced when object information is to be trans-
ferred between the visual and the tactile modality (Grefkes et al.,
2002). Our results crucially extend these findings, showing that
activity in aIPS increases with the mere implication of more
possible actions, i.e., the more visual properties of the objects
are mentally transferred to different, merely imagined tactile
properties.
The present study did not distinguish between seman-
tic/conceptual (“what”) and procedural/motor (“how to”) rep-
resentations triggered by the sight of objects, and its perfectly
possible that both are automatically evoked. However, there is
some evidence that aIPL is more related to the “how to” knowl-
edge related to objects. For instance, Boronat et al. (2005) asked
participants to determine whether two given objects are manipu-
lated similarly (e.g., a piano and a laptop keyboard) or serve the
same function (e.g., a box of matches and a lighter). Only the left
IPL was more engaged during judgments on manipulation than
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during judgments on object function (cf. Kellenbach et al., 2003
for parallel findings).
Patient studies support this interpretation, showing that dam-
age to the left IPL can result in an inability to recognize and
produce precise hand postures associated with familiar objects
while functional knowledge of objects seems spared (Buxbaum
and Saffran, 2002; Buxbaum et al., 2003). Binkofski and Buxbaum
(2013) proposed that two action systems have to be distinguished
in the dorsal stream: a bilateral dorso-dorsal “grasp” stream link-
ing superior parietal to dorsal premotor sites for reaching and
grasping objects based on their size, shape or orientation; and
a ventro-dorsal “use” system linking inferior parietal to ventral
premotor sites for skilled functional object use.
In the present study, objects varied with regard to the num-
ber of implied actions, and thereby ways to use the objects, but
of course, also in the way to grasp them. Although our para-
metric approach—object-evoked action options—tapped a very
subtle source of variance in our stimulus material (videos), this
approach did not allow distinguishing between automatically
evoked representations of object-related ways of manipulating,
and object-related ways of grasping (i.e., affordances). However,
participants were required to recognize the observed actions, and
hence could not solely rely on the observed kind of grasping;
rather, they had to exactly analyze the way of subsequent usage to
determine the observed action with confidence. Moreover, find-
ing PMv and aIPL to increase with the number of active action
codes points to the ventro-dorsal “use” system rather than to the
dorso-dorsal “grasp” stream.
Left pMTG showed up in the action vs. rest contrast, as
expected, as left pMTG is mostly seen in action observation, and
also for tool perception (cf. Introduction). However, just as left
aIPL, pMTGwas also found to positively co-vary with the number
of object-implied actions (Figure 4A). Fusiform gyrus, pMTG,
and aIPL are considered sensitive to the three types of informa-
tion required for identification of tools: their visual form, the
typical motion with which they move when we use them, and
the way they are manipulated, respectively (Beauchamp et al.,
2002; Mahon et al., 2007). Following this view, we suggest pMTG
and aIPL both co-varied in activation with the number of active
action codes, because action codes differed not only with regard
to the way we use objects, but also in the way the object moves
while used. For instance, when participants saw the actor han-
dling a knife and an apple, the automatically evoked action codes
included two sorts of knife manipulation, but also the corre-
sponding two sorts of knife motion. Of course, the visual form of
the knife was invariant, fitting to the fact that action codes showed
no effect in fusiform gyrus. Note that other authors have put for-
ward that pMTG rather than being a motion-coding area, repre-
sents conceptual object knowledge (Johnson-Frey, 2004; Fairhall
and Caramazza, 2013). There might be also subtle regional dif-
ferences in functions, as the posterior temporal region contains a
variety of functionally specialized areas.
In fact, pMTG refers to an only vague macroanatomical def-
inition of a cortical region that lies in direct vicinity of func-
tional related areas. The peak coordinates of the left MTG in
our study were at Talairach x = −47, y = −67, z = 9, which is
nearly identical to peak coordinates of the extrastriate body area
(EBA; x = ±47.2, y = −66.7, z = 4.7) when averaging across 13
recent fMRI studies (Downing et al., 2006a,b; Taylor et al., 2007;
Myers and Sowden, 2008). Moreover, human motion selective
area hMT (Greenlee, 2000; Peuskens et al., 2005) overlaps with
EBA (e.g., Downing et al., 2007; Taylor et al., 2007). Although
the parametric increase of activity in EBA or hMT in the cur-
rent experimental design cannot be due to demands on body
part and motion perception, it could reflect the range of move-
ments and body postures associated with a given object. On the
one hand, EBA’s contribution in the processing of body posture
(Downing et al., 2006b) could be required here as referring to
typical hand postures and configurations indicative of the manip-
ulations applicable to an object. On the other hand, hMT is
engaged in the processing of complex motion patterns (Peuskens
et al., 2005), but also in motion as merely implied or announced
by hand postures or objects (Kourtzi and Kanwisher, 2000).
Interestingly, both hMT and EBA, together with pSTS sensitive
to the perception of biological motion, were found to adapt to
the repetition of observed actions even when novel exemplars of
object manipulation were shown, suggesting a role of these areas
in the representation of the type of manipulation rather than its
particular instantiation (Kable and Chatterjee, 2006). Our find-
ings fit to this notion, as the parametric effect of action codes in
pMTG and aIPL was independent of the actual observation of one
of these actions (revealed by the conjunction of both).
EXPLOITING OBJECT-RELATED KNOWLEDGE TO RECOGNIZE ACTIONS
Only object-compatible, not object-incompatible actions
matched one of the action codes supposedly evoked by the
sight of the involved objects. Thus, the NAC quantified the
constraint imposed onto recognizing object-compatible, not
object-incompatible actions: the actually observed action was
one out of about one, two or three expectable actions. As
hypothesized, PMv activity positively co-varied with the NAC
in object-compatible but not incompatible actions. We found
this activation in both hemispheres, together with corresponding
activation foci in anterior IPL, bilateral lateral occipital cortex
extending into pMTG in the right hemisphere, and bilateral mid-
insula (Figure 4B). Activity in pIPS was bilateral, but pronounced
in the right hemisphere spanning from a ventral postcentral
region and anterior SMG up to the horizontal segment of the
IPS. The fact that left aIPL, the area that we had found for the
parametric effect of the NAC, surfaced in this interaction contrast
as well indicate that it was dominant, though not specific, for
object-compatible actions.
As outlined in the Introduction, we take this network to
reflect the fronto-parietal reinforcement of object-implied action
options while tracking the unfolding action. Here, the observed
action matched one of actions the observer was expecting due to
the observed object or set of objects. In this case, and only then,
PMv reinforced the matching action manipulation in IPL, and
the matching tool motion in pMTG. Further extrastriate visual
activation located in the right cuneus may point to modulations
going even further downstream.
Importantly, this interaction contrast tapped only into areas
whose activation increased with the competition load between
object-evoked action options. This effect was observed not only
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at the frontal component of the Action Network, but also at the
corresponding parietal and posterior temporal sites. Thus, rein-
forcement increases activation also at the targets in the posterior
brain. It is well-known that frontal and parietal/temporal areas
interact for selective purposes in attention, with the latter provid-
ing “bottom-up” externally driven, perceptual input on which the
frontal areas exert a “top-down” selective modulation for goal-
directed cognition and behavior (Frith, 2001; Bar, 2003; Pessoa
et al., 2003). For sure, the relevant parietal and temporal areas
themselves provide highly integrated information of the stimulus.
That is, they build rather a “mid” level between frontal and lower
visual areas, exerting “top-down” biasing signals on the latter as
well (Kastner and Ungerleider, 2001).
Premotor-parietal-temporal activation patterns during action
observation have been suggested to reflect a re-activation of
actions stored in memory (Decety and Ingvar, 1990; Jeannerod,
1999). Our findings specify this formula by showing that dur-
ing action observation, the premotor, parietal, and temporal
components of this network differ with regard to their sensitiv-
ity of object-implied actions: Unlike IPL and pMTG, PMv was
only sensitive for the exploitation of competing implied actions,
but not for the mere number of implied actions. While IPL
and pMTG reflected the action options both as evoked by the
sight of the objects (bottom-up) and as competition resolved
by frontal biasing signals (top-down), PMv was indifferent with
regard to the former: it showed for the number of action codes
effect for the interaction between, but not for the conjunction of,
object-compatible and object-incompatible actions.
In order to understand and interpret this finding, it helps
to consider three converging results in the present study:
PMv was present in both object-compatible and object-
incompatible action (conjunction contrast, Figure 5), more pro-
nounced in object-incompatible as in object-compatible actions
(masked direct contrast, Figure 5) (H3), and driven by object-
evoked action options in object-compatible but not in object-
incompatible actions (interaction of action codes and object
compatibility, Figure 4B). This data pattern suggests that PMv
not only registers object-evoked action representations, as aIPL
and pMTG do, but also dynamically applies these internal action
representations, either in order to adapt to, or to predict, the
ongoing action (cf. Schubotz, 2007).
As to the parietal activation revealed in the interaction con-
trast, it was found to extend from anterior to posterior IPS in
the right hemisphere. Why was pIPS activity so pronounced for
the right hemisphere? Mruczek et al. (2013) recently reported
that tools evoke stronger responses than non-tools in an anterior
intraparietal region. Authors suggest that posterior IPS encode
features common to any graspable object (including tools),
whereas anterior IPS integrate this grip-relevant information with
“experience-dependent knowledge of action associations, affor-
dances, and goals, which are uniquely linked to tools” (Mruczek
et al., 2013, p. 2892). Coordinates of activation maxima in poste-
rior IPS weremost closely located to those related tomacaque area
MIP (Grefkes and Fink, 2005). MIP is suggested to be involved
in coordination of hand movements and visual targets (Eskandar
and Assad, 2002), particularly in transforming the spatial coor-
dinates of a target into a representation that is exploited by the
motor system for computing the appropriate movement vector
(Cohen and Andersen, 2002). Interestingly, these computations
take place even in advance of the motion execution itself (Johnson
et al., 1996) and hence point to a role of MIP in the detection
of movement errors and their correction already on the basis of
internal models (Kalaska et al., 2003). More recent studies spec-
ify this region as providing tactile information to circuits linking
anterior intraparietal to ventral premotor regions, giving on-line
feedback needed for goal-directed hand movements (Gardner
et al., 2007a,b).
This computational profile was perfectly reflected in the
increase of activity in this region reported here, when pragmatic
object-implied constraints on expectable manipulations could be
integrated with the currently unfolding action. Also the notion
of detection of movement errors and their correction on the
basis of internal models (Kalaska et al., 2003) fits very well to
the present finding, as our parametric contrast pinpointed the
competition load between action options. Thus, when multiple
action options were implied by the perceived object or object set,
and hence represented as multiple internal models of potentially
observable manipulations, pIPS may contribute to the detection
of discrepancies between expected and observed manipulations.
To finally address activation in the mid-insula, this region
relays tactile information from the somatosensory cortex to the
frontal cortex (Burton and Sinclair, 2000). Activity was located at
the posterior short insula gyrus, which is delimited by the precen-
tral and central insular sulci. This dysgranular region has connec-
tions to SI and SII (cf. Guenot et al., 2004 for review). Together
with SII and SMG, the mid-insula is suggested to play a crucial
role in tactile object recognition, and to integrate somatosensory
information to provide a coherent image of an object appropri-
ate for cognitive action (Reed et al., 2004; Milner et al., 2007).
Since we found this region to positively co-vary in activity with
the number of object-implied expectable manipulations, but only
when the observed action matched one of them, we speculate that
the enhancement of the matching action comprised also a tactile
representation of the observed object manipulation.
OBSERVING OBJECT-INCOMPATIBLE ACTIONS: OBJECTS EVOKE
ACTION OPTIONS THAT DO NOT FOSTER ACTION RECOGNITION
In the present study, videos showing object-incompatible actions
(i.e., pantomimes with incompatible objects) were employed as
a control condition that served to tell apart effects that could be
only due to the sight of objects (common to object-compatible
and incompatible actions) from effects that could be only due
their manipulation (different between object-compatible and
incompatible actions). Objects and object sets were always rem-
iniscent of valid action options, both in object-compatible and
object-incompatible actions. Moreover, object-incompatible and
object-compatible actions were presented randomly intermixed
and each occurred with equal probability of 0.5. Together, these
design features provoked, as intended, an initial analysis of object
information and an attempt to match the observed actions on one
of the automatically evoked action code.
To be sure, object-incompatible action is certainly more than
just some kind of “incomplete” action, and there are posi-
tive effects of object-incompatible action, i.e., activations that
come in addition to what we see during observation of object-
compatible action. We have investigated these effects elsewhere
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(Schubotz and von Cramon, 2009). Replicating these findings,
object-compatible and object-incompatible action observation
yielded highly similar activation patterns in the resting contrast,
with significant differences only in the emphasis of different parts
of the Action Network (cf. conjunction in Figure 5). Thus, dif-
ferences in our parametric analyses in object-compatible and
object-incompatible action could not be due to principally absent
activations in the object-incompatible condition, i.e., “positive
effects” in the object-compatible action condition cannot be just
due to “negative effects” in object-incompatible actions.
It is important to note that humans are perfectly able to decode
actions from object-incompatible manipulations, even from early
childhood on (Fein, 1981). Also in the present study, participants
performed as well in object-incompatible trials (4.8% errors,
1232 ± 69ms reaction time) as in object-compatible action trials
(5.8% errors, 1192 ± 61ms reaction time). Saying that partic-
ipants failed to exploit object-evoked action representations in
the case of object-incompatible actions thus does not mean that
they failed in the task, but rather, that their strategy had to be
adapted according to the stimulus. Object-incompatibility was
revealed by a mismatch between the currently active action codes
and the actually observed manipulation. As object information
was invalid here, observers had to entirely rely on the analysis
of hand movements when trying to decode the currently pur-
sued action. In accordance with this suggestion, and replicating
a previous study (Schubotz and von Cramon, 2009), we found
that the entire Action Network engaged in manipulation recog-
nition (PMv, aIPS, pMTG) enhanced for object-incompatible as
compared to object-compatible actions (cf. Hypothesis H3).
However, we also reasoned that action codes should not result
in any significant effect on object-incompatible actions since they
cannot help to constrain the recognition process. However, the
novel and striking finding here was that activity in an area com-
prising left pSTS and TPJ did increase with the NAC. More
specifically, this activation was located in the horizontal pos-
terior segment of the pSTS, extending toward the ascending
posterior segment, and hence comprised a temporal-parietal-
occipital junction (BA 37, 39 and 19) (Figure 4D and blue spot in
Figure 4B). Activation was left-lateralized, corresponding to the
processing of information from the right visual field, and, in the
present study, the dominant (right) hand of the actor. This fits
well with the experimental setting as, to an observer, motion and
posture of the dominant hand is more informative than that of
the non-dominant hand; the latter typically holds and stabilizes
the object while the former performs the relevant manipulations.
Focus on the right visual field was also indicated by increased
activation in left cuneus (cf. Machner et al., 2009).
These effects of an increasing NAC were only found for object-
incompatible actions and indicated that, although object infor-
mation was in fact not usable here, the expectations of particular
hand movements announced by the objects still affected fur-
ther stimulus analysis. Note that the more action options were
evoked by the object, the lower were the constraints on the
to-be-expected manipulations. At the same time, the probabil-
ity increased that the actually observed manipulation eventually
matches one of the pre-activated actions: When you expect one
out of three potential actions to occur, a fourth and unexpected
action is more difficult to detect than in a case when you expect
exactly one specific action to occur.
With this in mind, we take left pSTS activation to reflect
the intensified focus on the hand’s movements in an attempt to
decode the displayed action. Interestingly, activation extended
posteriorly and dorsally into TPJ. Due to its particular func-
tional profile in attentional orienting as well as in mentalizing
paradigms (Decety and Lamm, 2007; Mitchell, 2008), TPJ has
been discussed to have a “where-to” functionality in analogy
with the spatial “where” functionality of the dorsal stream (Van
Overwalle, 2009). That is, it responds to externally generated
behaviors with the aim of identifying the possible end-state of
these behaviors (cf. discussion in Van Overwalle and Baetens,
2009). Note that the “end-state” of behavior can be read as being
actually related to the physical body, as TPJ is related to the
sensation of the position and the movement of one’s own body
(Blanke et al., 2004). Our findings corroborate this interpreta-
tion as they showed TPJ activation to proportionally increase
with the number of expectable end-states of the unfolding action.
Importantly, TPJ activation was not specific to or indicative of
object-incompatible (pantomime) perception in general, as the
TPJ effect was only found for the action code parameter in object-
incompatible actions, whereas it was absent in the direct contrast
object-incompatible vs. object-compatible action.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The faculty of understanding what other persons are doing is
based, among other factors, on the analysis of object and manip-
ulation information. The present study shows that the action-
observing brain accurately extrapolates the expectable actions
from the objects that the actor is handling, and, when detecting a
match between these expectable actions and the actually observed
one, subsequently reinforces the matching action against the
competition of the remaining but unobserved actions. These find-
ings impressively reflect that object-evoked actions constrain the
recognition process in action observation
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